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Individuals seem to differ in conditionability, i.e., the ease by which the contingent presen-
tation of two stimuli will lead to a conditioned response. In contemporary learning theory,
individual differences in the etiology and maintenance of anxiety disorders are, among oth-
ers, explained by individual differences in temperamental variables (Mineka and Zinbarg,
2006). One such individual difference variable is how people process a learning experience
when the conditioning stimuli are no longer present. Repeatedly thinking about the condi-
tioning experience, as in worry or rumination, might prolong the initial (fear) reactions and
as such, might leave certain individuals more vulnerable to developing an anxiety disorder.
However, in human conditioning research, relatively little attention has been devoted to the
processing of a memory trace after its initial acquisition, despite its potential influences on
subsequent performance. Post-acquisition processing can be induced by mental reitera-
tion of a conditioned stimulus-unconditioned stimulus (CS-US)-contingency. Using a human
conditioned suppression paradigm, we investigated the effect of repeated activations of a
CS-US-contingency memory on the level of conditioned responding at a later test. Results
of three experiments showed more sustained responding to a “rehearsed” CS+ as com-
pared to a “non-rehearsed” CS+. Moreover, the second experiment showed no effect of
rehearsal when only the CS was rehearsed instead of the CS-US-contingency. The third
experiment demonstrated that mental CS-US-rehearsal has the same effect regardless of
whether it was cued by the CS and a verbal reference to the US or by a neutral signal,
making the rehearsal “purely mental.” In sum, it was demonstrated that post-acquisition
activation of a CS-US-contingency memory can impact conditioned responding, underlin-
ing the importance of post-acquisition processes in conditioning. This might indicate that
individuals who are more prone to mentally rehearse information condition more easily.
Keywords: conditioning, human learning, CS-US-contingency, rehearsal, post-acquisition processing, conditioned
suppression
INTRODUCTION
In classical conditioning, a learning experience is often considered
to end when the conditioning stimuli are no longer present. This
is based on the fact that conditioning refers to the contingent pre-
sentation of an originally neutral stimulus (conditioned stimulus,
CS) together with a biologically relevant unconditioned stimulus
(US), resulting in the CS becoming a signal for US-onset and thus
evoking a conditioned response (CR) during subsequent presen-
tations (Bouton, 2007). This CR can be decreased or eliminated
by non-reinforced presentations of the CS, a procedure called
“extinction.” It is generally assumed that conditioning comprises
both learning and memory: the learning of a CS-US-contingency
builds up a memory (“encoding”), which is stored (“consolida-
tion”) and can be reactivated upon future confrontations with
that CS (“retrieval”). The strength of the CR is a function of these
three processes.
Most conditioning research is focused on the encoding phase
(which comprises the actual learning) and much less on consol-
idation and retrieval. However, the latter phases may have major
effects on long-term conditioning. For instance, in the case of
Pavlovian conditioning, human participants may mentally reflect
upon the conditioning experience by repeatedly reactivating either
the CS-representation, the US-representation, or the entire experi-
ence (CS-US-contingency memory). This repeated thinking about
a negative experience might be akin to repetitive thought processes
such as worry and rumination, as will be discussed in more detail
shortly. The current research aimed to investigate the role of indi-
vidual differences in such repetitive thought on the strength of
conditioned responding.
Current evidence suggests that repeated reactivation of the con-
ditioning memory results in higher CRs at a later test compared
to conditions that do not include such active post-acquisition
processing. First, the impact of US-rehearsal has been investi-
gated by Davey and colleagues (Jones and Davey, 1990; Davey and
Matchett, 1994). After conditioning, participants in the experi-
mental group were asked to rehearse the US whenever the word
“think” was presented on the screen, while control participants
rehearsed either a non-aversive event or an unrelated aversive
event. It was demonstrated that participants who rehearsed the
US after acquisition retained a skin conductance response (SCR)
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during subsequent CS-presentations while this was not true for
controls. Arntz et al. (1997) replicated this finding using SCR’s,
but not when relying on anxiety ratings. Arguably, mental repe-
tition of the US leads to stronger conditioned responding upon
subsequent CS-presentations.
A second active post-acquisition procedure that could result in
stronger conditioned responding is mentally reiterating the CS-
US-contingency. As it is well-known that the contingency between
the CS and the US is important in determining a CR, the procedure
of repeated post-acquisition activation of the CS-US-contingency
memory merits investigation as well. A preliminary indication of
this effect can be found in a study by Yaremko and Werner (1974)
who showed that repeatedly imagining a previously presented
tone-shock-contingency elicited more pronounced electrodermal
responses during subsequent extinction than imagining the same
stimuli in an unpaired way. Imagining was cued by auditory pre-
sentations of the words “tone” and “shock.” Although not set
up as a study about post-acquisition processing in conditioning
(thus lacking appropriate control for acquisition strength), this
study at least suggests that repeated mental activation of a CS-US-
contingency impacts subsequent CRs. A second line of studies,
performed in rabbits, provides only indirect support for a role of
rehearsal in conditioning. Wagner and colleagues (e.g., Wagner
et al., 1973; Terry and Wagner, 1975) investigated rehearsal as an
explanatory mechanism for the fact that a US needs to be unex-
pected for CS-US-learning to occur. They suggested that rehearsal
of conditioning events was crucial in conditioning. Furthermore,
given that the rehearsal capacity of an organism is limited, they
predicted (and showed) that a surprising event that would com-
mand rehearsal could interfere with the necessary rehearsal and
thus with the learning of other CS-US-pairings. Based on these
findings, Wagner (1981) developed the model of Standard Oper-
ating Procedures (SOP) which states that conditioned associations
require the joint rehearsal of the representations of the CS and the
US in memory.
It is surprising that these post-acquisition processes have
received only little attention in human conditioning research,
while they play a central role in the memory literature. For
instance, rehearsal, a type of post-acquisition processing defined
as the covert or overt repetition of information (Atkinson and
Shiffrin, 1971) is studied extensively and is implicated as an impor-
tant factor in most models of memory functioning (Anderson,
1999). It is well established that more rehearsal, both in fre-
quency as in length of the rehearsal period, typically results in
enhanced memory for the rehearsed information (Ebbinghaus,
1885/1913; Johnson, 1980). As conditioning relies on both learn-
ing and memory (Bouton and Moody, 2004), it seems obvious
to study post-acquisition rehearsal processes in conditioning. In
a first attempt to address this issue, we (Joos et al., 2012b) inves-
tigated the role of post-acquisition processing in fear learning,
by examining the impact of rehearsing an aversive conditioned
association (CS= picture; US= human scream) on subsequent
fear responding. Fear responding to the picture-CS which was
previously paired with the scream persisted in participants who
rehearsed this contingency, but decreased in participants who had
been asked to rehearse a different contingency. In the current
manuscript, the role of post-acquisition processing is studied in
a conditioned suppression paradigm that allows us to investigate
whether the earlier findings in fear conditioning also apply in a
more neutral contingency learning task. More importantly, giv-
ing it’s less time-consuming nature, this paradigm allows a more
in depth analysis of the influence of rehearsal on conditioned
responding using different rehearsal procedures (see below).
Besides the theoretical relevance of post-acquisition processes
in conditioning, studying these processes is ecologically valid as
well. In general, it is believed that some aspects of anxiety dis-
orders are explained by conditioning processes (Rachman, 1991;
Craske et al., 2006; Field, 2006), i.e., undergoing a conditioning
experience (such as a car accident) can install subsequent fear reac-
tions (such as driving phobia). However, large differences exist in
whether or not an individual develops an anxiety disorder after
such an (aversive) learning experience.
In contemporary learning theory, it is suggested that such
individual differences in the etiology and maintenance of anx-
iety disorders could, among others, be explained by individual
differences in temperamental variables, such as trait anxiety and
behavioral inhibition (Levey and Martin, 1981; Mineka and Zin-
barg, 2006; Mineka and Oehlberg, 2008; Joos et al., under review).
However, we hypothesize that the differential tendency to engage
in repetitive thought, such as worry or rumination, might also be
an important factor in explaining differences in conditionability.
Not only is trait anxiety highly associated with repetitive thought
(e.g., Meyer et al., 1990), but it is also demonstrated that trait
worry predicts the strength of fear acquisition (Otto et al., 2007;
Joos et al., 2012c). Participants scoring higher on the Penn State
Worry Questionnaire (Meyer et al., 1990) demonstrated enhanced
fear learning.
As such, differences in the strength of a CR, could in part
be explained by differences in how people process a learning
experience when the conditioning stimuli are no longer present.
Individuals might repeatedly reflect upon an aversive condition-
ing experience, which might be akin to repetitive thought processes
such as worry and rumination (Watkins, 2008). The potential role
of repetitive thought in anxious responding is supported by the
fact that individual differences in worry and rumination correlate
with anxious symptoms (e.g., Meyer et al., 1990; Segerstrom et al.,
2000; Fresco et al., 2002; Muris et al., 2004; Ehring et al., 2011).
Moreover, repetitive thought (worry and/or rumination) has even
been shown to predict the level of anxiety or anxiety symptoms
in prospective designs (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Segerstrom et al.,
2000; Calmes and Roberts, 2007; Hong, 2007; McLaughlin et al.,
2007; Watkins, 2008). In sum, the more one engages in repeti-
tive thought, the more anxiety symptoms are experienced. Hence,
given the role of conditioning processes in anxiety, we believe
that repeatedly thinking about a conditioning experience, as in
worry or rumination, might prolong the initial (fear) reactions
and as such, might leave certain individuals more vulnerable to
developing an anxiety disorder.
Given these correlational findings, we wanted to investi-
gate experimentally the influence of differential post-acquisition
processing (i.e., mental rehearsal) on subsequent conditioned
responding. To this aim, we modeled differences in repeti-
tive thought by experimentally inducing repeated activation of
a conditioning experience. In the present studies, we targeted
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post-acquisition processing of the CS-US-contingency, rather
than activation of the CS- or the US-representation. In Exper-
iments 1 and 2, participants were primed to rehearse the CS-
US-contingency by presenting the CS and a verbal label referring
to the US, in line with Yaremko and Werner (1974). This proce-
dure allowed us to control the content of participant’s thoughts.
Moreover, this cued rehearsal procedure might resemble repetitive
thought in real-life. A cue activates both the mental representations
of the CS and the US and the association between them, but the
US is never directly experienced. This resembles cued recall of fear
memory by real-life confrontations with the phobic stimulus (e.g.,
driving a car). Given that this rehearsal procedure might entail
additional acquisition trials (due to visual presentation of the CS),
the procedure is contrasted with a purely mental rehearsal proce-
dure, as used by Davey and colleagues (Jones and Davey, 1990).
As repetitive thought is often purely mental as well, this procedure
might more closely resemble ruminative thinking, i.e., repetitive
thought that is cued by intrusions or memories of the condi-
tioning event. In general, we hypothesize that mental reiteration
of a CS-US-contingency, in the absence of real US-presentations,
results in more conditioned responding compared to when no
repeated activation occurs. This repetitive mental evocation of the
CS-US-contingency memory is further referred to as “rehearsal.”
We used a conditioned suppression paradigm, known as the
Martians preparation, which has proven to be sensitive to a wide
range of CS-US-contingency manipulations (for a review, see
Franssen et al., 2010). This preparation was developed by Arce-
diano et al. (1996) to create a human analog for the conditioned
suppression task used in animal conditioning. In such a task,
the amount of suppression of an operant response serves as a
behavioral measure of the strength of Pavlovian conditioning.
As the Martians preparation is developed for use in humans, an
instructed US is employed, rather than a biologically significant
US. The task is set up as a computer game in which participants
utilize their laser-gun (space bar) to shoot Martians. However,
shooting during activation of the anti-laser shield (US) results in
an inescapable invasion of Martians. Space scenes (CSs) predict the
occurrence of the anti-laser shield. Learning is evident when par-
ticipants refrain from bar pressing during a CS+. Using this prepa-
ration it was examined whether rehearsing a CS-US-contingency
results in more conditioned suppression to a rehearsed CS+ than
to a non-rehearsed CS+.
EXPERIMENT 1
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Participants were 42 volunteers aged between 18 and 53 years
(M = 22.17, SD= 6.01). They participated in partial fulfillment
of course requirements or were paid for their participation. The
study was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the
ethical committee of the faculty. All gave informed consent and
were instructed that they could decline further participation at any
time. They were uninformed about the purpose of the experiment
and had no previous experience with the Martians preparation,
apart from one participant who was excluded specifically for this
reason. Three other participants were excluded due to problems
during the procedure (talking and being distracted during bar
pressing). The results for 38 participants (ages 18–27, M = 21.05,
SD= 2.20; 31 women) were included in the data-analysis.
Stimuli and apparatus
All participants were tested individually. Participants responded
using the space bar of the keyboard. The Martians preparation
was implemented into a flexible Windows95 ™environment by
Baeyens and Clarysse (1998), using Microsoft Visual C++ 5.0 and
was recently adapted into MartiansV2 by Franssen et al. (2010).
Background pictures of four multi-colored space scenes served
as CSs and were counterbalanced across individuals. CS-duration
was 1.5 s, but was extended to 3 s during crucial test trials. The
US consisted of a 0.5 s white flashing screen (5 flashes at a rate of
10 flashes/s; interflash time= 50 ms) accompanied by a metallic
sound played in continuous looping (73 dBa). All sounds were
presented binaurally through headphones (Philips SHP 2000).
The images of the Martians and the explosions that appeared
after “shooting” a Martian were multi-colored stimuli measur-
ing 50× 50 pixels. A screenshot of the Martians preparation is
presented in Figure 1.
Procedure
In the Martians computer game, participants have to shoot incom-
ing Martians by pressing the space bar (operant behavior). A
Pavlovian CS-US-contingency is superimposed on this operant
task. The US is described as an anti-laser shield. Participants have
to refrain from bar pressing during activation of this anti-laser
shield because otherwise, an inescapable invasion of Martians fol-
lows. The Martians procedure typically consists of various phases.
In the two experiments presented here, these were: pre-training
phase, US-only phase, acquisition, and acquisition test phase,
rehearsal phase, and rehearsal test phase.
During the Pre-training phase, participants learned to emit a
regular pattern of operant responding (bar pressing). Martians
landed on the screen in rows from left to right and from top to bot-
tom at a rate of 4/s. A full screen consisted of 7 rows and 10 columns
(inter-row distance= 20 pixels, inter-column distance= 20 pix-
els). If full, the screen rolled up in a continuous fashion to make
room for new Martians. Participants learned to press the space
bar at the same rate as the appearance of Martians (4/s). In that
case, only explosions rather than Martians appeared. However, if
participants barpressed at a higher rate, not all Martians were shot
and explosions appeared occasionally. The task for the participant
was to make as many explosions appear as possible. Neither CSs
nor USs were presented during this phase.
During the entire experiment, instructions were given both
orally and visually on the computer screen (for an overview of
instructions, see Baeyens et al., 2001). Participants could practice
the bar pressing behavior for 25 s (100 Martians) during which the
experimenter gave oral guidance if needed. After this phase (and
after the US-only phase, the acquisition/acquisition test phase and
the post-rehearsal phase) visual feedback was provided in the form
of hit percentage.
The purpose of the next phase, the US-only phase was to intro-
duce the instructed US, represented by the so-called “anti-laser
shield” (combination of a flashing screen and a metallic sound).
During the US, Martians appeared at the same rate as before. In
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FIGURE 1 | Screenshot from the Martians preparation. Depicted are Martians and explosions (when Martian is shot by pressing the space bar) against a
CS-background picture of a space scene.
this phase no CSs were presented. Participants learned to refrain
from bar pressing when the anti-laser shield was activated, since
pressing the space bar during this period evoked an inescapable
invasion of Martians. An invasion lasted for 5 s and consisted of the
landing of “thousands”of Martians (at a rate of 20/s) accompanied
by a new sound played in continuous looping (79 dBa). During this
invasion, bar pressing was ineffective (no explosions appeared con-
tingent upon bar pressing). The US-only phase entailed four trials.
On average, the inter-trial interval lasted for 7.5 s (SD= 2.5 s).
This was the case throughout the whole experiment. The first two
trials were used by the experimenter to explain (a) what an anti-
laser shield looks like and (b) what happens if one presses the
space bar during the anti-laser shield. Throughout the following
two trials, participants could practice avoiding bar presses dur-
ing the US which was virtually impossible as the USs appeared
unannounced.
The Acquisition phase entailed the introduction of Pavlovian
CS-US-contingencies which were superimposed on the operant
baseline task. Participants were instructed that indicators would
appear (background pictures) that might predict the occurrence
of the US. They had to learn to distinguish good (CS+) from bad
(CS−) predictors. In case of a good predictor, participants had
to refrain from bar pressing to avoid pressing during the anti-
laser shield. In case of a bad predictor, this suppression behavior
was undesirable as not pressing the space bar would result in the
successful landing of numerous Martians.
The Acquisition phase included training with two different
CS+s and two different CS−s. A CS+ was immediately followed
by the US. A CS−was never followed by the US. Space scenes were
counterbalanced between participants, serving either as the CS+
that would be rehearsed (CS+R) or that would not be rehearsed
(CS+NR) or as one of both CS−‘s (CS−A or CS−B). This resulted
in 12 counterbalancing conditions. All CSs lasted for 1.5 s and were
presented five times each, generating 20 (randomized) trials. For
the CS+ trials, a 80% reinforcement schedule was used in order to
obtain suboptimal conditioning.
The Acquisition phase was immediately followed by the Acquisi-
tion Test phase. This transition was not noticeable to participants.
The Acquisition Test phase comprised one non-reinforced pre-
sentation of every CS. Trial order was again randomized. During
this test phase, every CS was presented for 3 s instead of 1.5 s to
allow a more accurate measurement of the suppression behavior.
Throughout the Acquisition and the Acquisition Test phase, trials
lasted for 7 s. During the ITI’s, the background screen was black.
The light in the room was dimmed during these phases.
In the Rehearsal phase, the crucial manipulation was imple-
mented. The goal was to prompt participants to mentally rehearse
one of the CS-US-contingencies they had acquired in the pre-
vious phase. The CS+ that was part of the rehearsed CS-US-
contingency is referred to as the rehearsed CS+. The other CS+
is called the non-rehearsed CS+. As a background for this dif-
ferential mental rehearsal participants were asked to engage in
a so-called attention training task that “could affect their future
task performances.” More precisely, they were requested to focus
their attention on one of the background pictures (CS+R) that
was previously presented and to think about this background
and how it co-occurred with the flashing anti-laser shield. When
they noticed being distracted, participants had to gently refocus
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their attention on the background – anti-laser shield-compound.
Participants were prompted to keep refocusing their attention
whenever necessary. The training task was set up as a cover story
to ensure rehearsal of both the CS and the US. The stimuli of the
other CS-US-contingency were never presented during this phase.
The background picture (CS+R) and the word “anti-laser shield”
(in Dutch) were presented six times for 15 s, alternated with a 10-s
black screen. This was done to repeatedly draw the attention of
the participants to the screen. The attention training task lasted
for 2 min 20 s and was conducted twice. After each training, partic-
ipants rated how easy/difficult it was for them to focus (and keep
focused) their attention on the background and the flashing anti-
laser shield on a 21-point scale ranging from−100 (very difficult )
to+100 (very easy) in steps of 10. In between both training tasks,
a filler task consisting of two questionnaires was administered1.
After the Rehearsal phase the effects of mental rehearsal were
monitored. Participants were redirected to the Martians com-
puter task for the Rehearsal Test phase. Once more, the light was
dimmed. Participants were instructed that the task was identical
as before and that they were again expected to shoot Martians
to stop them from invading Earth. They had to avoid bar press-
ing during the anti-laser shield and pay attention to the signals
(CSs) to infer US-occurrence. No further instructions were given.
However, when a participant asked whether the anti-laser shield
would occur again, he/she was told that this possibility existed.
The phase consisted of three blocks of one unreinforced presenta-
tion of the four CSs (CS+R, CS+NR, CS−A, and CS−B) to ensure
a reliable assessment of conditioned responding after rehearsal.
Within each block of four trials, trial order was randomized. Since
testing occurred under extinction, the first test trial was the most
crucial one as non-reinforced presentations might have reduced
conditioned responding in the subsequent test trials. After the test
phase, participants were thanked for their participation.
RESULTS
Manipulation check
After each training task, participants rated the difficulty of focus-
ing their attention on a scale ranging from −100 (very difficult )
to +100 (very easy). If participants reported being distracted
during rehearsal, this might have influenced the quality of CS-
US-rehearsal. The mean attention scores for the first and second
attention training as well as the overall mean score for both tasks
are presented in Table 1. As negative scores indicate difficulties
to focus attention, we excluded for further analyses three partici-
pants who obtained a negative score averaged over both training
tasks.
1In Experiment 1, the Penn State Worry Questionnaire – Past Day (PSWQ-PD;
Joos et al., 2012a) and the Sensitivity for Punishment-Sensitivity for Reward-
questionnaire (SPSRQ; Torrubia et al., 2001) were administered at this stage. In
Experiment 2, the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer et al., 1990), the
Mindfulness Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS; Brown and Ryan, 2003), and the
Questionnaire upon Mental Imagery (QMI; Sheehan, 1967) were administered. In
Experiment 3, the MAAS and the PSWQ-PD were filled out. There were no signif-
icant associations between the questionnaire scores and the effect of rehearsal on
conditioning performance. These null findings might be attributed to the fact that
the rehearsal manipulation in the current studies overruled the effect of individual
difference variables on the strength of the conditioning response.
Dependent variable
In conditioned suppression tasks like the Martians task, suppres-
sion of the operant response (bar pressing) serves as a measure
of the strength of classical conditioning. Participants’ behavior
is expressed in terms of suppression ratios (SRs) of the form
a/(a+ b), where a is the number of responses during the CS, and b
the number of bar presses in an equal period of time immediately
preceding CS-onset. This implies that a SR equaling 0.5 indicates
no suppression at all, while a SR equaling 0 designates complete
suppression of the operant response.
Acquisition test
Figure 2 displays SRs as a function of Phase and CS-type. Data
from the Acquisition Test phase were analyzed using a repeated
measures ANOVA with CS-type (CS−Average/CS+R/CS+NR) as
within-subjects variable2. The main effect of CS-type was sig-
nificant, F(2, 68)= 23.64, p< 0.0001, MSE= 0.007, η2p = 0.41,
indicating successful differential acquisition. Planned compar-
isons indicated that the SRs for the CS+R and the CS+NR
were significantly lower than the SR for CS−Average, F CS+R(1,
34)= 22.01, p< 0.0001, MSE= 0.009; F CS+NR(1, 34)= 40.10,
p< 0.0001, MSE= 0.008. Given the interest in a differential effect
between both CS+s after rehearsal, a non-differential level of con-
ditioning for both CS+s is a prerequisite, which was fulfilled, F(1,
34)= 1.89, p= 0.18.
Rehearsal test
Figure 2 suggests that the rehearsal manipulation had an effect on
the level of suppression to the CS+s at test. This was supported by
a 2 (Phase: Acquisition test/Rehearsal test average)× 2 (CS-type:
CS+R/CS+NR)-repeated measures ANOVA, including average SRs
over three test trials (Rehearsal test average), which revealed a
significant Phase×CS-type interaction, F(1, 34)= 5.53, p< 0.05,
MSE= 0.005, η2p = 0.14. This indicates a different course of sup-
pression over time to the rehearsed than to the non-rehearsed
CS+. Planned comparisons at test demonstrated that the CS+R
evoked a stronger CR than the CS+NR, F(1, 34)= 4.26, p< 0.05,
MSE= 0.005. A decrease in conditioned suppression is present
for both CS+s, but is stronger for the non-rehearsed CS+, F(1,
34)= 32.67, p< 0.0001, MSE= 0.006, than for the rehearsed CS+,
F(1, 34)= 5.63, p< 0.05, MSE= 0.008.
Thus, the hypothesis about the effect of rehearsal on con-
ditioned responding is supported. As the test phase comprised
three trials which were conducted under extinction, the effect
of rehearsal was also investigated for responding on the first
test trial only. Using a 2 (Phase: Acquisition test/Rehearsal test
1)× 2 (CS-type: CS+R/CS+NR)–repeated measures ANOVA, it
was shown that the crucial Phase×CS-type interaction was sig-
nificant, F(1, 34)= 6.77, p< 0.05, MSE= 0.009, η2p = 0.17.
Again, planned comparisons demonstrated that after rehearsal,
the CS+R evoked a stronger CR than the CS+NR, F(1, 34)= 5.69,
p< 0.05, MSE= 0.01. Moreover, conditioned responding to the
2In all 3 three experiments, data were first analyzed using an ANOVA with CS-type
(CS−-A, CS−-B, CS+R, and CS+NR) as within-subjects variable (and Group as
between-subjects variable in Experiments 2 and 3). Given that in every group of
participants the SR’s did not differ between both CS−‘s, SRs for both stimuli were
always averaged for use in subsequent analyses.
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Table 1 | Mean attention score (and standard deviations) on the first and the second attention training task and average for both tasks, as a
function of experimental group for Experiments 1, 2, and 3.
Attention training 1 Attention training 2 Average
M SD M SD M SD
Experiment 1 58.05 28.77 40.34 37.72 49.20 30.47
Experiment 2 CS-US-rehearsal 56.25 33.73 32.50 39.92 44.38 31.84
CS-rehearsal 66.25 18.61 29.58 40.59 47.92 24.54
Visual rehearsal 46.30 40.11 34.44 35.99 40.37 36.90
Experiment 3 Mental rehearsal 23.08 50.89 21.53 45.67 22.31 45.59
Control 49.60 37.47 27.60 49.69 38.60 41.72
FIGURE 2 | Experiment 1. Mean suppression ratio’s (SR) as a function of phase (acquisition test, rehearsal test 1, rehearsal test 2, and rehearsal test 3) and
CS-type (CS−Average, CS+R, and CS+NR). CS−Average = the average for both CS−‘s. CS+R = rehearsed CS+, CS+NR =non-rehearsed CS+. Error bars denote
standard error.
non-rehearsed CS+ attenuated from acquisition test to rehearsal
test 1, F(1, 34)= 6.03, p< 0.05, MSE= 0.009, while this was not
the case for the rehearsed CS+, F(1, 34)= 1.48, p= 0.23.
DISCUSSION
Experiment 1 was set up to test whether repeated activation of
a previously acquired CS-US-contingency memory impacts con-
ditioning effects to that CS in the long-term. The results clearly
show stronger conditioned responding to the rehearsed CS+ as
compared to the non-rehearsed CS+, indicating that mental reiter-
ation of a CS-US-experience strengthens subsequent conditioned
responding. An important observation is however that, rather than
causing an increment in responding, rehearsal seems to sustain
responding, while the absence of rehearsal results in decreased
CRs. This pattern is further investigated in Experiment 3.
After demonstrating an effect of rehearsal, we wanted to
explore the boundary conditions of this effect. As both CS+s were
paired with the same US, the observed rehearsal effect cannot be
attributed to rehearsal of the US alone. Indeed, US-rehearsal would
elicit the same level of responding to both CS+s at test. However, at
this point it is unclear whether repeated activation of the CS alone
would result in increased conditioned responding as well. Indeed,
it might be the case that the observed effect should be attributed to
CS-rehearsal rather than to rehearsal of the CS-US-contingency.
Experiment 2 was set up to investigate this possibility.
EXPERIMENT 2
In addition to investigating whether the findings of Experiment 1
could be replicated, this experiment was conducted with the aim to
extend these promising findings. More precisely, it was investigated
whether mental reiteration of a CS alone results in increased or
sustained responding as well, in which case the observed rehearsal
effect in Experiment 1 could be attributed to CS-rehearsal.
That CS-rehearsal could increment responding has been shown
in studies regarding sensitization or incubation. First, rehearsal of
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the CS might result in a sensitization of conditioned responding,
i.e., an increase in responsiveness caused by the (covert) repetition
of a stimulus (Groves and Thompson, 1970). As such, this might
underlie a strengthening of the CR after CS-US-rehearsal. Second,
in fear conditioning, it is proposed that short unreinforced presen-
tations of the CS might result in an increment, rather than a decre-
ment, in responding. Since Eysenck (1968) termed this phenom-
enon “incubation,” some studies have provided tentative support
for this hypothesis (e.g., Rohrbaugh and Riccio, 1970; Rohrbaugh
et al., 1972). Until now, little evidence exists that repeated CS-
only presentations promote a progressive increase in CR strength
(Nicholaichuk et al., 1982; Kaloupek, 1983). Most studies demon-
strate that short duration CS-presentations evoke resistance to
extinction, rather than incubation (Stone and Borkovec, 1975;
Sandin and Chorot, 1989). A process of incubation, either defined
as an increment in conditioned responding or a resistance to
extinction, would result in more conditioned suppression to the
rehearsed CS+ (as compared to the non-rehearsed CS+) after the
rehearsal phase as well.
To test the impact of rehearsing the CS without reference
to the US, two conditions were included. Besides the “CS-US-
Rehearsal”-group, a replication of Experiment 1, this study com-
prised a control condition, “CS-Rehearsal.” Participants in this
condition were requested to rehearse the CS, instead of the CS-
US-contingency. Conversely, it is important to note that most
learning theories would predict extinction, characterized by a
decrement rather than an increment in CR, after unreinforced
CS-presentations (Hermans et al., 2006). Given these conflicting
predictions, it is important to include this control group. If condi-
tioned responding is only sustained after CS-US-rehearsal and not
after CS-rehearsal, the data from Experiment 1 cannot be ascribed
to mental reactivations of the memory of the CS alone.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Fifty psychology students participated in return for course credits.
All participants provided informed consent and were instructed
that they could decline further participation at any time during
the experiment. They were all uninformed about the purpose of
the experiment. Two participants were excluded due to technical
problems. The remaining 40 females and 8 males, aged 17–21 years
(M = 18.13, SD= 0.74), were randomly assigned either to the
condition “CS-US-Rehearsal” or the condition “CS-Rehearsal,”
resulting in 24 participants in each condition.
Procedure
The same apparatus, software, and stimuli were used as in Exper-
iment 1. For both conditions, the Pre-training phase, the US-
only phase and the Acquisition and Acquisition Test phase were
identical to those in Experiment 1. Only the Rehearsal phase dif-
fered between both experiments. Similarly, the aim of this phase
was to evoke mental rehearsal of previously presented stimuli.
However, while participants in one condition rehearsed a CS-
US-contingency as in Experiment 1, participants in the other
condition had to mentally rehearse a CS+, without reference to
the US. Hence, participants in this condition were merely asked
to focus their attention on one of the background pictures that
was previously presented. As always, they were requested to gen-
tly refocus their attention when they noticed being distracted. As
in Experiment 1, the attention training cover story was applied to
obtain rehearsal. During the Rehearsal phase, the same parameters
were used. More precisely, in the “CS-US-Rehearsal”-group, the
background picture, and the word “anti-laser shield” (in Dutch)
appeared on the screen six times. In the“CS-Rehearsal”-condition,
only the background picture (CS+R) was presented, again for six
times alternated with black screens.
The attention training was again executed twice and each train-
ing phase was followed by a short rating of the difficulty to focus
their attention. The training phases were separated by the admin-
istration of three filler questionnaires. Upon completion of the
Rehearsal phase, an unrelated computer task (causal learning task)
was administered. Subsequently, participants were redirected to
the first computer for the Rehearsal Test phase, which consisted
of three blocks, each containing one unreinforced presentation of
every CS.
RESULTS
Manipulation check
The mean attention scores for the first and second training task
(see Table 1) did not differ between both conditions, t 1(46)= 1.27,
p= 0.21; t 2(46)= 0.25, p= 0.80, nor did the attention score when
averaged over both tasks, t (46)= 0.43, p= 0.67. As in Experiment
1, we excluded for further analyses the (two) participants who
obtained a negative score when averaged over both training phases.
Acquisition test
Suppression ratio’s for each condition are presented in Figure 3, as
a function of Phase and CS-type. Acquisition data were analyzed
using a 2× 3-repeated measures ANOVA with Group (“CS-US-
Rehearsal”/“CS-Rehearsal”) as a between-subjects variable and
CS-type (CS−Average/CS+R/CS+NR) as a within-subjects vari-
able. Participants displayed differential conditioned responding
to the CS+s as compared to the CSs. Overall, there was a main
effect of CS-type, F(2, 88)= 73.83, p< 0.0001, MSE= 0.007,
η2p = 0.63, but no significant Group×CS-type interaction, F(2,
88)= 0.04, p= 0.96, indicating no group differences in differential
responding.
Planned comparisons confirmed that in the “CS-US-
Rehearsal”-condition, the CS+R and the CS+NR generated sig-
nificantly more conditioned responding than the CS−Average,
F CS+R(1, 44)= 44.53, p< 0.0001, MSE= 0.008; F CS+NR(1,
44)= 53.21, p< 0.0001, MSE= 0.008. Participants demonstrated
an equal amount of suppression for both CS+s, F(1, 44)= 0.55,
p= 0.46. This indicates that no differences in responding existed
between both CS+s before the onset of the rehearsal phase. Sim-
ilarly, participants in the “CS-Rehearsal”-condition demonstrated
more conditioned responding to the CS+R, F(1, 44)= 44.70,
p< 0.001, MSE= 0.008, and the CS+NR, F(1, 44)= 52.57,
p< 0.001, MSE= 0.008, than to the CS−Average. Again, no sig-
nificant differences emerged between both CS+s, F(1, 44)= 0.45,
p= 0.51.
Rehearsal test
The left panel of Figure 3 (“CS-US-Rehearsal”-condition) shows a
data pattern that generally replicates Experiment 1. After rehearsal,
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FIGURE 3 | Experiment 2. Mean suppression ratio’s for the
“CS-US-Rehearsal”-group, who rehearsed the CS-US-contingency,
and the “CS-Rehearsal”-group, who rehearsed only the CS, as a
function of phase (acquisition test, rehearsal test 1, rehearsal test 2,
and rehearsal test 3) and CS-type (CS−Average, CS+R, and CS+NR).
CS−Average = the average for both CS−‘s. CS+R = rehearsed CS+,
CS+NR =non-rehearsed CS+, Acq. Test= acquisition test. Error bars
denote standard error.
the CS+R evokes more conditioned responding than the CS+NR.
In line with predictions, this data pattern is absent for the “CS-
Rehearsal”-group. To investigate whether mentally rehearsing the
CS-US-contingency or the CS alone differentially impacts subse-
quent CRs, a 2 (Group: “CS-US-Rehearsal”/“CS-Rehearsal”)× 2
(Phase: Acquisition test/Rehearsal test average)× 2 (CS-type:
CS+R/CS+NR)-repeated measures ANOVA was conducted. As in
the previous experiment, data of the three test trials were averaged
to obtain a more reliable assessment. The Group×Phase×CS-
type interaction failed to reach significance, F(1, 44)= 2.44,
p= 0.13. However, after exclusion of the two participants who
experienced difficulties focusing their attention during the first
attention task rather than exclusion of those participants with
a negative score when averaged over both tasks, the three-way
interaction was marginally significant, F(1, 44)= 3.82, p= 0.057,
MSE= 0.004. Although only marginally significant, the partial eta
squared (η2p) of.08 suggests that this interaction can be interpreted
as a medium to large effect (Stevens, 2002).
Follow-up analyses using simple interactions showed that
for the “CS-US-Rehearsal”-condition, the Phase (Acquisition
test/Rehearsal test average)×CS-type (CS+R/ CS+NR) interac-
tion was significant, F(1, 44)= 10.62, p< 0.005, MSE= 0.005,
η2p = 0.19. Planned comparisons confirmed that the CS+R
produced significantly more conditioned suppression than the
CS+NR, F(1, 44)= 15.22, p< 0.001, MSE= 0.004, at rehearsal
test. Moreover, the decrease in suppression was significant for
the CS+NR, F(1, 44)= 45.74, p< 0.0001, MSE= 0.005, but
non-significant for the CS+R, F(1, 44)= 3.95, p= 0.05. For
the “CS-Rehearsal”-condition, the overall Phase (Acquisition
test/Rehearsal test average)×CS-type (CS+R/ CS+NR) inter-
action failed to reach significance, F(1, 44)= 1.32, p= 0.26.
Rehearsing a CS+ alone does not seem to impact subsequent
CRs to this CS. This conclusion is corroborated by planned
comparisons showing no difference in SR between both
CS+s at test, F(1, 44)= 0.87, p= 0.36. Responding to both
CS+s decreased significantly from acquisition to rehearsal
test, F CS+R(1, 44)= 5.84, p< 0.05, MSE= 0.007; F CS+NR(1,
44)= 19.23, p< 0.0001, MSE= 0.005.
Given that the Group×Phase×CS-type interaction failed to
reach significance for the average SR over three test trials and
given that rehearsal test 1 is probably the most valid test trial, the
impact of rehearsal was also assessed for the first test trial only.
A 2 (Group)× 2 (Phase: Acquisition test/Rehearsal test 1)× 2
(CS-type) ANOVA was conducted, which revealed a margin-
ally significant three-way interaction, F(1, 44)= 3.98, p= 0.052,
MSE= 0.007, η2p = 0.08 (medium to large effect). Moreover, after
exclusion of the two participants with difficulties to focus during
the first attention task (instead of averaged over both tasks), this
interaction was significant, F(1, 44)= 6.07, p< 0.05, MSE= 0.006,
η2p = 0.12 (medium to large effect), providing support for the
differential impact on conditioned responding of rehearsing a
CS-US-contingency versus a CS alone.
Follow-up analyses targeting the data for the “CS-US-
Rehearsal”-condition, yielded a significant Phase×CS-type inter-
action, F(1, 44)= 10.75, p< 0.005, MSE= 0.007, η2p = 0.20.
Planned comparisons showed that the CS+R produced signif-
icantly more suppression than the CS+NR at rehearsal test 1,
F(1, 44)= 13.48, p< 0.001, MSE= 0.008. Comparable to Experi-
ment 1, the SR for the CS+R remained intact after rehearsal, F(1,
44)= 0.33, p= 0.57, while responding to the CS+NR decreased
from acquisition to rehearsal test 1, F(1, 44)= 13.24, p< 0.001,
MSE= 0.008. Taken together, these data replicate the finding
of a strengthened CR to a CS after mental CS-US-rehearsal.
Data for the “CS-Rehearsal”-condition showed that the Phase
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(Acquisition test/Rehearsal test)×CS-type interaction was non-
significant, F(1, 44)= 0.29, p= 0.59, indicating that CS-rehearsal
did not impact responding. Planned comparisons provided addi-
tional support for this conclusion by showing no difference in SR
between both CS+s at rehearsal test 1, F(1, 44)= 0.03, p= 0.87.
Unexpectedly, responding did not show a significant decrement
between acquisition test and rehearsal test 1 for both CS+s,
F CS+R(1, 44)= 0.53, p= 0.47; F CS+NR(1, 44)= 2.15, p= 0.15, as
was the case for rehearsal test average.
In sum, it seems that while rehearsal of the CS-US-compound
sustains conditioned responding to the rehearsed CS+ as com-
pared to the non-rehearsed CS+, this is not the case when only
the CS+ is rehearsed.
DISCUSSION
Experiment 2 was set up to test whether the effects of Experi-
ment 1 were due to reactivations of the CS-memory or of the
CS-US-memory. First, the results of the“CS-US-Rehearsal”-group
in Experiment 2 replicated the findings of Experiment 1. As such,
this study provides additional evidence that mental reiteration of
a CS-US-contingency strengthens conditioned responding to that
CS+ relative to responding to a non-rehearsed CS+. In addition,
the results from the “CS-Rehearsal”-group showed no difference
between the rehearsed and the non-rehearsed CS+ and as such, no
evidence for sensitization or incubation of responding after CS-
rehearsal was provided. This points to the conclusion that mental
repetition of only the CS is not sufficient to produce the effect
of Experiment 1 (sustained CRs at test). Because Experiments 1
and 2 also showed no effect on the CS+ that was conditioned to
the same US but not rehearsed (CS+NR) in the CS-US-rehearsal
groups, the observed effect should probably not be attributed to
rehearsal of the US either. The main conclusion is that mental
reiteration of a CS-US-contingency causes sustained conditioned
responding, while reactivation of the CS or the US alone does not
have this effect.
It is important to note that we cannot rule out the possi-
bility that participants in the “CS-Rehearsal”-group might have
also thought about the US during instructed CS-rehearsal. How-
ever, given the clear difference in instructions (and cueing on
the screen) between both experimental groups, we believe that
participants in the “CS-US-rehearsal”-condition at least thought
more about the CS-US-compound than participants in the
“CS-rehearsal”-condition.
An important question is to what extent our rehearsal manipu-
lation might simply constitute additional acquisition trials. During
the rehearsal phase, we presented the CS-picture and a verbal
reference to the US. Although this procedure does not comprise
experience with the actual US (sensory characteristics), it may pro-
duce additional learning of the mere CS-US-contingency. During
“pure” rehearsal, these additional contingency experiences would
be internally generated (thinking back of the co-occurrences of
the CS and the US), whereas they were externally generated in
Experiments 1 and 2. Moreover, repetitive thought does not only
occur during presentations of the phobic stimuli (CS). Indeed,
individuals often think about past conditioning experiences in
the absence of the CS or US, so a purely mental rehearsal proce-
dure would seem more akin to repetitive thought. Therefore, we
conducted a third experiment, which included a new condition in
which participants were prompted by a neutral signal to rehearse
the CS-US-contingency in a purely mental way, i.e., without being
primed by the visual presence of the CS and a verbal reference
to the US. This procedure was in line with the paradigm used by
Davey and colleagues (Jones and Davey, 1990; Davey and Match-
ett, 1994). A non-differential rehearsal effect in the visually aided
rehearsal condition as in the purely mental rehearsal condition
would indicate that the observed rehearsal effect should not be
attributed to additional training during rehearsal.
A second important note is that both in Experiments 1 and 2 the
rehearsal effect seems partly driven by a decrease in CR to the non-
rehearsed CS+, rather than by an increase in CR to the rehearsed
CS+. This decrement may reflect the natural course of conditioned
responding over time; rehearsal would then prevent this sponta-
neous decrease in responding (see General Discussion). However,
it is also possible that the CS-US-rehearsal trials primarily pro-
duce their effect by reducing responding to the non-rehearsed
CS+, such that rehearsal of one CS-US-contingency interferes
with responding to the other CS+, which was presented during the
same learning phase. Such interference has been shown before, for
instance in studies by Pineno and colleagues (Matute and Pineno,
1998; Pineño et al., 2000) demonstrating impaired responding to
X when X+ training was followed by A+ training. Similarly, in
our studies the decrease in CR to the non-rehearsed CS+ can
be considered as the result of stimulus competition between ele-
mentally trained CSs evoked by mental rehearsal trials pairing
the rehearsed CS+ and the US. A related memory phenomenon
is retrieval-induced forgetting, which refers to the situation where
retrieval of a subset of formerly studied material (e.g., CS+R –
US) causes subsequent forgetting of the non-retrieved material
(e.g., CS+NR – US; Bäuml et al., 2010, p. 1048). In a recent
study by Ortega-Castro and Vadillo (2013), retrieval-induced for-
getting was demonstrated using word pairs, where several cues
predicted a common outcome. As such, rehearsal/retrieval of one
CS-US-contingency might induce forgetting of the non-rehearsed
contingency.
In order to evaluate this possibility, we included an extra control
group in Experiment 3 who“rehearsed”an irrelevant picture-word
pair after acquisition. This group will show the natural course
of responding to a CS+ from acquisition to test. A significant
decline in CRs for both CS+s in this group would indicate that the
observed decrease in CRs to the non-rehearsed CS+ should not
be attributed to interference.
EXPERIMENT 3
Experiment 3 comprised three experimental groups. The first
group, “Visual Rehearsal,” was largely a replication of the CS-US-
rehearsal groups in the previous experiments, including visually
aided CS-US-rehearsal. The second group, “Mental Rehearsal,”
entailed a purely mental rehearsal procedure, without any visual
guidance (except during instructions). Finally, participants in the
“Control”-condition rehearsed an unrelated picture-word pair.
We expected sustained suppression to the rehearsed CS+, but a
decrease in responding to the non-rehearsed CS+ in both rehearsal
groups. Moreover, a decline in CRs to both CS+s was expected in
the “Control”-condition.
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MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Eighty students participated either in return for course cred-
its or as paid volunteer. They provided informed consent and
were uninformed about the purpose of the study. Partici-
pants were randomly allocated to either the “Visual Rehearsal”-
condition (n= 27), the “Mental Rehearsal”-condition (n= 27) or
the “Control”-condition (n= 26). The data of two participants
(from “Mental Rehearsal”-group and “Control”-condition) had
to be excluded due to apparatus failure. The remaining 78 par-
ticipants (63 women) had a mean age of 19.63 (SD= 2.46; range
17–34).
Procedure
The apparatus, software, and stimuli were again identical as in
Experiment 1. Moreover, the same procedure was used, with only
the Rehearsal phase differing from the previous studies. Dur-
ing this phase, all participants received instructions to rehearse
the co-occurrence of two related stimuli, using the attention
training cover story (with same parameters). In both rehearsal
conditions (Visual/Mental Rehearsal), participants received the
same instructions as in the CS-US-rehearsal conditions from the
previous experiments asking them to focus their attention on
one of the background pictures (CS+R) and how it co-occurred
with the anti-laser shield. A slide with the CS and a verbal ref-
erence to the US was additionally presented on the computer
screen to ensure that all participants were aware of the stim-
uli on which to “focus their attention.” While participants in
the “Visual Rehearsal”-condition were presented with this CS-
picture and a verbal reference to the anti-laser shield during the
rehearsal phase, participants in the “Mental Rehearsal”-group saw
only an exclamation mark, prompting them to a purely men-
tal repetition of the conditioning stimuli. Participants in the
“Control”-condition were also requested to focus their atten-
tion on a picture, a word and how they co-occurred. To ensure
that they had equal visual experience with the CS-picture and
the anti-laser shield as participants in the “Mental Rehearsal”-
group, control participants were presented with a CS+ -picture
and a verbal reference to the anti-laser shield as an example of
a possible picture-word pair they could encounter in the follow-
ing phase. Subsequently, it was further clarified that they had to
focus on clouds and how these co-occurred with rain. A visual
display of a picture of clouds and the word “rain” was presented
during these instructions and during the following Rehearsal
phase.
After each training phase, participants rated how difficult it was
to focus their attention. In between both training phases, three
questionnaires were administered. The Rehearsal phase and the
Rehearsal Test phase were separated by an unrelated computer
task (causal learning task).
RESULTS
Manipulation check
The attention score during the first and second attention training
task and the score when averaged over both tasks (see Table 1) did
not significantly differ between groups,as evidenced by the absence
of an effect of group in several one-way ANOVAs with Group
as between-subjects variable, F training 1(2, 75)= 2.89, p= 0.06,
F training 2< 1, p= 0.57, F training 1+2(2, 75)= 1.50, p= 0.23. As in
Experiments 1 and 2, participants who obtained a negative atten-
tion score averaged over both training phases were excluded.
This was the case for five participants (18.52%) in the “Visual
Rehearsal”-condition, seven participants (26.92%) in the “Men-
tal Rehearsal”-condition and four participants (16.00%) in the
“Control”-condition.
Acquisition test
Figure 4 depicts SRs for each condition as a function of
Phase and CS-type. As can be seen in the graph, participants
show successful differential acquisition with higher SRs to the
CS−Average than to the CS+s. However, the level of responding
to the CS+s after acquisition seems to differ according to the
experimental group. This is corroborated using a 3× 3-repeated
measures ANOVA with Group (“Visual Rehearsal”/“Mental
Rehearsal”/“Control”) as between-subjects variable and CS-type
(CS−Average/ CS+R/ CS+NR) as within-subjects variable. This
ANOVA yielded a main effect of CS-type, F(2, 118)= 125.25,
p< 0.0001, MSE= 0.005, η2p = 0.68, which was qualified by a sig-
nificant Group×CS-type interaction, F(4, 118)= 2.76, p< 0.05,
MSE= 0.005, η2p = 0.09.
Further analyses showed that participants in the “Visual
Rehearsal”-condition demonstrated less suppression to CS−Average
than to CS+R, F(1, 59)= 58.40, p< 0.0001, MSE= 0.006, and
CS+NR, F(1, 59)= 84.89, p< 0.0001, MSE= 0.006. Both CS+s
evoked a non-differential amount of suppression, F(1, 59)= 2.44,
p= 0.12. The same pattern was evident for participants in
the “Control”-condition, with higher SRs to both CS+s than
to CS−Average, F CS+R(1, 59)= 80.53, p< 0.0001, MSE= 0.006;
F CS+NR(1, 59)= 66.25, p< 0.0001, MSE= 0.006, and a non-
differential level of responding to both CS+s, F(1, 59)= 1.61,
p= 0.21. However, while participants in the “Mental Rehearsal”-
condition again demonstrated more suppression to the CS+s than
to the CS−Average, F CS+R(1, 59)= 21.80, p< 0.0001, MSE= 0.006;
F CS+NR(1, 59)= 45.40, p< 0.0001, MSE= 0.006, they showed sig-
nificantly more suppression to the CS+NR than to the CS+R, F(1,
59)= 5.01, p< 0.05, MSE= 0.004, which is unexpected given that
the procedure was identical for both CS+s until then.
Rehearsal test
Figure 4 suggests a general decrease in CRs to both CS+s
in the “Control”-condition and a smaller decrease in condi-
tioned responding to the CS+R than to the CS+NR after CS-
US-rehearsal in both rehearsal groups, which is in line with
our hypotheses. This was supported by a 3 (Group: “Visual
Rehearsal”/“Mental Rehearsal”/“Control”)× 2 (Phase: Acquisi-
tion test/Rehearsal test average)× 2 (CS-type: CS+R/ CS+NR)-
repeated measures ANOVA. As before, data of the three test trials
were combined. This analysis revealed a significant Phase×CS-
type interaction, F(1, 59)= 7.46, p< 0.01, MSE= 0.003, η2p =
0.11, that subsumed under a significant Group×Phase×CS-type
interaction, F(1, 59)= 3.27, p< 0.05, MSE= 0.003, η2p = 0.10,
indicating that the course of responding to both CS+s was differ-
entially influenced by the rehearsal manipulation depending on
the experimental group.
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FIGURE 4 | Experiment 3. Mean suppression ratio’s for the “Visual
Rehearsal”-group, who rehearsed the CS-US-association with visual
guidance, the “Mental Rehearsal”-group, who rehearsed the
CS-US-contingency without visual guidance, and the
“Control”-condition, who rehearsed an irrelevant picture-word pair, as
a function of phase (acquisition test, rehearsal test 1, rehearsal test 2,
and rehearsal test 3) and CS-type (CS−Average, CS+R, and CS+NR).
CS−Average = the average for both CS−‘s. CS+R = rehearsed
CS+,CS+NR =non-rehearsed CS+, Acq. Test= acquisition test. Error
bars denote standard error.
The three-way interaction was further explored using simple
interactions and planned comparisons. In the “Control”-
condition, conditioned suppression significantly decreased at the
same rate for both CS+s during rehearsal of an unrelated picture-
word pair, F CS+R(1, 59)= 36.74, p< 0.0001, MSE= 0.004;
F CS+R(1, 59)= 24.72, p< 0.0001, MSE= 0.005, as evidenced by
a non-significant Phase×CS-type interaction, F(1, 59)= 0.25,
p= 0.62. In contrast, in the “Visual Rehearsal”-condition, the
Phase×CS-type interaction was significant, F(1, 59)= 7.62,
p< 0.01, MSE= 0.003, indicating a stronger decrease in suppres-
sion for the CS+NR than for the CS+R. Responding to both CS+s
decreased from acquisition to test, but this decrease was larger
for the CS+NR, F(1, 59)= 39.28, p< 0.0001, MSE= 0.005, than
for the CS+R, F(1, 59)= 13.73, p< 0.001, MSE= 0.004. These
results point toward an effect of visually aided CS-US-rehearsal
on subsequent CRs. Likewise, the Phase×CS-type interaction in
the “Mental Rehearsal”-condition also reached significance, F(1,
59)= 6.03, p< 0.05, MSE= 0.003, with a smaller decrease in CRs
for the CS+R, F(1, 59)= 12.17, p< 0.001, MSE= 0.004, than for
the CS+NR, F(1, 59)= 33.04, p< 0.0001, MSE= 0.005.
To investigate whether visually aided CS-US-rehearsal
had a different impact on responding than purely men-
tal CS-US-rehearsal, the Group (“Visual Rehearsal”/“Mental
Rehearsal”)×Phase×CS-type interaction was assessed. This
interaction failed to reach significance, F(1, 59)= 0.007, p= 0.94,
suggesting that both forms of rehearsal influenced responding
in the same way. Furthermore, given our hypothesis that the
decline in responding to the CS+NR after CS-US-rehearsal reflects
a natural course of responding, the 3 (Group)× 2 (Phase) inter-
action was assessed for the CS+NR. This interaction was non-
significant, F(2, 59= 0.41, p= 0.66, indicating that responding to
the CS+NR decreases to the same extent after CS-US-rehearsal as
after rehearsal of an irrelevant picture-word pair.
As the first test trial is considered the most valid one, the data
were also analyzed when taking into account only the change in
responding from post-acquisition to the first rehearsal test trial. A
3 (Group: “Visual Rehearsal”/“Mental Rehearsal”/“Control”)× 2
(Phase: Acquisition test/Rehearsal test 1)× 2 (CS-type: CS+R/
CS+NR)-repeated measures ANOVA revealed a non-significant
Group×Phase×CS-type interaction, F(1, 59)= 1.25, p= 0.29.
Further analyses for the three conditions separately revealed
that for participants in the “Control”-condition, the Phase×CS-
type interaction was not significant, F(1, 59)= 0.13, p= 0.72.
Both CS+s evoked significantly less suppression at rehearsal
test 1 than at acquisition test, F CS+R(1, 59)= 12.07, p< 0.001,
MSE= 0.005, F CS+NR(1, 59)= 7.57, p< 0.01, MSE= 0.006, indi-
cating that rehearsal did not impact responding. In the “Men-
tal Rehearsal”-group, responding to the CS+NR significantly
decreased between acquisition and rehearsal test 1, F(1, 59)= 6.13,
p< 0.05, MSE= 0.006, while no such decrease was present for the
CS+R, F(1, 59)= 0.02, p= 0.90, suggesting sustained responding
to the CS+R. The Phase×CS-type interaction was only mar-
ginally significant, F(1, 59)= 3.37, p= 0.07, MSE= 0.006. The
same pattern emerged for participants in the “Visual Rehearsal”-
group. Again, CRs significantly decreased for the CS+NR during
the rehearsal phase, F(1, 59)= 8.25, p< 0.01, MSE= 0.006, but
not for the CS+R, F(1, 59)= 2.78, p= 0.10. The Phase×CS-type
interaction was however not significant, F(1, 59)= 0.86, p= 0.36.
Based on visual inspection of Figure 4, we tested whether
the Phase×CS-type interaction differed between both rehearsal
groups, given that the rehearsal effect on the first test trial
seems more pronounced in the “Mental Rehearsal”-condition.
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The Group (“Visual/Mental Rehearsal”)×Phase×CS-type inter-
action failed to reach significance, F(1, 59)= 0.51, p= 0.48, indi-
cating a non-differential effect of visually aided and purely mental
rehearsal.
Given that the pattern of results in Figure 4 suggests a delayed
effect of rehearsal in the “Visual Rehearsal”-group, we examined
the change in responding between acquisition test and the final
test trial for both CS+s using a 3 (Group)× 2 (Phase: Acqui-
sition test/Rehearsal test 3)× 2 (CS-type) ANOVA. In line with
the previous findings, the same rate of CR decrease was observed
for both CS+s in the “Control”-condition, F CS+R(1, 59)= 47.89,
p< 0.0001, MSE= 0.007, F CS+NR(1, 59)= 41.75, p< 0.0001,
MSE= 0.007, with a non-significant Phase×CS-type interac-
tion, F(1, 59)= 0.0003, p= 0.99. In contrast, in both rehearsal
groups, suppression declined significantly stronger for the
CS+NR, F Mental Rehearsal(1, 59)= 47.84, p< 0.0001, MSE= 0.007;
FVisual Rehearsal(1, 59)= 51.78, p< 0.0001, MSE= 0.007, than
for the CS+R, F Mental Rehearsal(1, 59)= 23.25, p< 0.0001,
MSE= 0.007; FVisual Rehearsal(1,59)= 19.57,p< 0.0001,MSE= 0.007,
as evidenced by a significant Phase×CS-type interaction in both
the “Mental Rehearsal,” F(1, 59)= 5.73, p< 0.05, MSE= 0.004,
and the “Visual Rehearsal”-condition, F(1, 59)= 9.25, p< 0.005,
MSE= 0.004. The overall Group×Phase×CS-type interaction
was however only marginally significant, F(1, 59)= 2.60, p= 0.08,
MSE= 0.004. In sum, although suggested by the data pattern, no
strong evidence exists that visually aided CS-US-rehearsal has a
more delayed effect on responding than purely mental rehearsal.
DISCUSSION
The data pattern in the “Visual Rehearsal”-group replicated the
findings of Experiments 1 and 2. After rehearsal of the CS+R,
suppression to the CS+NR decreased significantly stronger than
suppression to the CS+R. Moreover, responding to the CS+R
seemed to persist longer as evidenced by a non-significant decline
from post-acquisition to the first rehearsal test, while this decrease
was significant for the CS+NR. Importantly, the same pattern
emerged for the“Mental Rehearsal”-condition. Again, the decrease
in responding was significantly stronger for the CS+NR than for
the CS+R and responding to CS+R sustained on the first rehearsal
test trial. This suggests that the rehearsal effects of Experiments
1 and 2 should not be attributed to the fact that the rehearsal
trials simply constitute additional acquisition trials. Rehearsal
impacts responding both when the to-be-rehearsed information
is externally or internally generated.
Importantly, the crucial Group×Phase×CS-type interaction
was significant, demonstrating an effect of rehearsal in both CS-
US-rehearsal groups, but not in the “Control”-group. However,
three important notes should be made. First, in the “Mental
Rehearsal”-condition, responding to both CS+s already differed
at the end of the acquisition phase, which is unexpected given
that both CS+s underwent the exact same procedure until then.
Although responding to the CS+R shows a slower decrease than
responding to the CS+NR, the CS+R does not evoke significantly
more suppression after rehearsal than the CS+NR, which might
be attributed to this unexpected post-acquisition difference. Sec-
ond, because of the difference between both rehearsal conditions
in baseline responding to the CS+’s the non-significance of the
Group (Visual Rehearsal/Mental Rehearsal)×CS-type interaction
should be interpreted with caution. Third, in contrast to Experi-
ments 1 and 2, the rehearsal effect is most strongly present for the
overall rehearsal test and to a lesser extent for the first test trial
only.
The significant decline for both CS+s in the “Control”-
condition seems to demonstrate that the natural course of condi-
tioned suppression is to decrease over time, rather than to persist at
the same level. This suggests that the decrease in responding to the
CS+NR during CS-US-rehearsal in the current and the previous
experiments, should not be attributed to some kind of interference
from the CS+R.
A final important remark is that more participants had to be
excluded because of a negative attention score than in the previous
experiments. Although the number of participants with a negative
score was not significantly associated with the experimental group,
χ2(2)= 1.033, p= 0.60, this exclusion was especially remarkable
in the “Mental Rehearsal”-condition, where 26.92% of the partic-
ipants were omitted. Presumably, this should be attributed to the
less concrete nature of the rehearsal task in this group, where only
an exclamation mark was presented.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In human conditioning studies, relatively little attention has been
devoted to the processing of a memory trace after its initial
acquisition. In an attempt to explore the role of active post-
acquisition processing in conditioning, we experimentally induced
repeated activation of a CS-US-contingency memory and tested
whether this impacted conditioned responding at test. Experi-
ment 1 showed that rehearsing a previously acquired CS-US-
contingency leads to stronger CRs to the rehearsed than to a
conditioned, but non-rehearsed CS+. In Experiment 2 this effect
was replicated and, in addition, it was shown that no such dif-
ference occurred when rehearsal was focused on the CS alone
(rather than the CS-US-contingency). Experiment 3 demonstrated
that the same rehearsal effect is found regardless of how mental
rehearsal is induced. Priming rehearsal through visual presenta-
tion of the CS-picture and a verbal reference to the US (as in
Experiments 1 and 2) has the same effect as a purely mental
procedure. Moreover, results of the “Control”-condition suggest
that the natural course of responding to CS+s after acquisition
(and during an irrelevant rehearsal task) is a decrement in sup-
pression. An important limitation of Experiment 3 is formed by
the post-acquisition differences in responding between the con-
ditions. While the rehearsed and the non-rehearsed CS+ evoked
the same amount of responding in the “Visual Rehearsal” and
the “Control”-condition, this was not the case in the “Mental
Rehearsal”-condition. The reason for this unexpected difference
in unclear, but it might complicate interpretation of our find-
ings. However, overall, the data show that repeatedly activating
the memory trace of a CS-US co-occurrence impacts subsequent
conditioned responding, even in the absence of direct experience
with the phenomenological aspects of CS-US-pairings. Interest-
ingly, a recurrent finding is that rather than increasing the level of
responding, CS-US-rehearsal results in persistent CRs, while the
absence of mental activation causes responding to decline. We will
discuss this issue in more detail below.
Frontiers in Psychology | Personality Science and Individual Differences May 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 305 | 12
Joos et al. Repeated activation of a CS-US-contingency memory
Based on Experiments 1 and 2 an important question was to
what extent the rehearsal manipulation entailed learning processes
rather than memory processes. Indeed, the procedure of repeat-
edly activating the CS-US-contingency might have constituted
additional training trials, given that the CS-US-contingency was
partially presented. However, the results of Experiment 3 showed
that purely mental rehearsal, which was not cued by the CS and
a verbal reference to the US and was thus internally generated,
affected conditioned responding in a similar way.
This issue demonstrates that research on rehearsal effects in
conditioning is located at the interface of learning and mem-
ory. Two alternative positions exist regarding the interrelation of
these two processes. One perspective is that learning occurs only
when external input is present, while memory processes pertain
to internally generated input. In that case, learning occurred in
Experiments 1 and 2, while the rehearsal manipulation in Experi-
ment 3 elicited a memory process, rather than a learning process.
An alternative viewpoint is to define learning as a change in behav-
ior due to experience (e.g., Bower and Hilgard, 1981). In this
perspective, learning occurred in all three experiments, as the
results showed a change in conditioned behavior compared to
when no repeated activation was induced. In sum, both learning
and memory seem crucial in understanding conditioning effects
(cf. Bouton and Moody, 2004) and their interplay is an important
but generally ignored topic.
The current research ties up with an increasing body of research
demonstrating that mental representations of a conditioning stim-
ulus can influence conditioned responding in the absence of the
physical stimulus. An overview of this literature is provided by
Dadds et al. (1997), Holland (1990), and Pickens and Holland
(2004). In short, there are two important lines of evidence for
the fact that activation of the mental representation of a stimu-
lus can induce learning to that stimulus. First, in US-revaluation
studies it is found that conditioned responding decreases/increases
after devaluation/inflation of the US without directly experienc-
ing the CS-US-contingency (e.g., Rescorla, 1974; White and Davey,
1989; de Jong et al., 1996). Second, in studies on representation-
mediated learning (Holland, 1990; Pickens and Holland, 2004)
it is typically shown that an associatively activated stimulus rep-
resentation can substitute for actually presented stimuli. Besides
demonstrating that an association may be formed with a stimulus
when the stimulus is not presented, it is also demonstrated that
associations may be formed between two stimuli even when both
of the stimuli are absent, rather than only one of them (e.g., in
animals: Holland and Sherwood, 2008; in humans: Le Pelley and
McLaren, 2001).
Besides the theoretical importance of our results in bring-
ing research traditions on memory and learning closer together,
the idea of mental rehearsal is clinically relevant as well. Over-
all, the data indicate that not only the acquisition experiences
themselves, but also the way in which one cognitively engages
in the memories of these events, has an impact on conditioned
responding. Clinical observations suggest that individuals differ
in their tendency to engage in repetitive thought such as worry
and rumination. Repetitive thought is defined as “the process
of thinking attentively, repetitively, or frequently about one’s self
and one’s world” (Segerstrom et al., 2003, p. 909). Hence, this
variable can be considered as a form of active rehearsal. After
experiencing a traumatic event, rehearsal of this negative event
together with associated stimuli might strengthen the acquired
CS-US-association. Previous work by Otto et al. (2007), as well
as a more recent study in our laboratory (Joos et al., 2012c),
points in that direction. Otto et al. (2007) found trait worry to
be a good predictor of the strength of fear acquisition. We repli-
cated the finding that individuals with a higher level of worry
demonstrated more pronounced fear acquisition. Moreover, this
association could not be explained by trait anxiety (Joos et al.,
2012b). One way to explain this relation between worry and con-
ditioning strength is that the high trait-worriers mentally repeat
the CS-US-contingency during acquisition and therefore show
stronger conditioned responding in the fear conditioning task. Of
course, post-acquisition mental repetition of the fear memory is
only one route that might play a role. As such, these studies do not
provide direct evidence of the impact of rehearsal after acquisition
and differ in this respect from the experimental studies presented
in this paper.
Given the conclusion that post-acquisition rehearsal impacts
conditioned responding, an important question pertains to the
exact processes that are responsible for this effect. A first can-
didate in explaining the results is consolidation, which refers to
the progressive post-acquisition strengthening of memory traces
in long-term memory (Dudai, 2004). Repeated activation of the
CS-US-contingency might strengthen the association between the
mental representations of the CS and the US in memory, resulting
in a cognitive consolidation of this memory trace.
A second mechanism focuses on the decrease in conditioned
responding to the non-rehearsed CS+. As suggested before, the
CS-US-rehearsal trials might interfere with responding to the
non-rehearsed CS+ at test. However, the results of the “Control”-
condition of Experiment 3 indicate that the recurrently observed
decrease in responding to the non-rehearsed CS+ is the natural
course of responding and should therefore not be attributed to
interference by a related stimulus (CS+R), as the same reduction
in CRs is evident when no related stimulus was rehearsed.
That the natural course of conditioned suppression after
rehearsal is to decrease, rather than to persist at the same level
supports the likelihood of a third possible underlying mecha-
nism, i.e., prevention-of-forgetting. Indeed, this decrease might be
considered as a type of forgetting. Hence, mentally rehearsing
a CS-US-contingency might prevent forgetting of this memory
trace through repeated activation. This idea is in line with the
notion that rehearsal prevents the loss of information in short-
term memory (e.g., Atkinson and Shiffrin, 1971; Portrat et al.,
2008). More specifically, as forgetting in conditioning probably
relates to a lack of accessibility of the memory trace rather than
a loss of information (Anderson, 2000; Bouton, 2004), rehearsal
might counteract a spontaneous decrease in accessibility of the
memory trace. In all three reported experiments, we see a decrease
in CR strength to the non-rehearsed CS+ between acquisition and
test, supporting the claim that participants “forget” this associa-
tion to some extent. For the “CS-Rehearsal”-group in Experiment
2, conditioned responding to both CS+s also decreases between
acquisition and test, but this decrease fails to reach statistical
significance on the first test trial. However, the non-significant
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Group×Phase (Acquisition test/Rehearsal test 1) interaction for
the non-rehearsed CS+ suggests that both groups show the same
decreasing pattern of responding to the non-rehearsed CS+. Over-
all, our data seem to support the notion that rehearsal renders the
CS-US-memory more accessible, resulting in stronger CRs upon
subsequent CS-presentations compared to presentations of the
non-rehearsed CS.
In conclusion, the present studies show that repeated post-
acquisition activation of a CS-US-contingency sustains condi-
tioned responding. Through experimental induction of post-
acquisition CS-US-repetition, it was shown that active post-
encoding processes such as rehearsal, which are frequently studied
in the memory literature, might play an important role in condi-
tioning as well. In particular, long-term conditioning effects may
be largely influenced by such memory processes. Additionally, our
results indicate that individual differences in the tendency to reflect
upon past experiences, as in worry or rumination, might create
differences in conditioned responding, due to varying levels of
post-acquisition activation of the CS-US-memory.
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